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RACIAL BALANCING PROVISIONS AND 
CHARTER SCHOOLS: ARE CHARTER 
SCHOOLS OUT ON A CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMB? 
Preston C. Green, III* 
Critics have claimed that our public educational system has 
failed to develop innovative ideas, attract exceptional teachers, 
or hold incompetent teachers and administrators accountable 
for their students' inability to learn. 1 Thirty-six states, 2 the 
District of Columbia,3 and Puerto Rico4 have attempted to ad-
* Department of Educational Policy, Research, and Administration, School of 
Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
1. JOE NATHAN, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CREATING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR 
AMERICAN EDUCATION (1996). 
(1) Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.03.250-.290 (Michie 2000); (2) Arizona, ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. §§ 15-181-15-189.03 (2000); (3) Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-23-101- 507 (Mi-
chie 2000); (4) California, CAL. ED. CODE§§ 47600- 47664 (Deering, 2000); (5) Colo-
rado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-30.5-101- 209 (1999); (6) Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 10-66aa-gg (1999); (7) Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit.14, §§ 501-516 (1999); (8) 
Florida, FLA. STAT. chs. 228.056-.058 (1999); (9) Georgia, GA. CODE §§ 20-2-2060-
2071 (2000); (10) Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 302A-1181-1188 (2000); (11) Idaho, 
IDAHO CODE§§ 33-5201-5212 (2000); (12) Illinois, 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/27A-1-
5/32-2.13 (West 2000); (13) Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1903-1910 (1999); (14) 
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 17:3971-4001 (2000); (15) Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 71 § 89 (Law. Co-op. 2000); (16) Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 380.501-
518 (2000); (17) Minnesota, MINN. STAT. §§ 124D.10-.11 (1999); (18) Mississsippi, 
MISS. REV. STAT. §§ 37-28-1-21 (2000); (19) Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 160.400-
.420 (1999); (20) Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 386.500-.610 (Michie 2000); (21) 
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 194-8:1-22 (1999); (22) New Jersey, N.J. 
STAT. §§ 18A:36A-1-18 (West 1999); (23) New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-8B-1-
8C-7 (Michie 2000); (24) New York, N.Y. C.L.S EDUC. §§ 2850-2857 (McKinney 2000); 
(25) North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-238.29A-K (1999); (26) Ohio, OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 3314.01- .020 (Anderson 2000); (27) Oklahoma, 70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 3-
130-152 (1999); (28) Oregon, 1999 Or. Laws 200 (1999); (29) Pennsylvania, 24 PA. 
STAT.§§ 17-1701-A-1732-A (2000); (30) Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 16-77-2-77-
1.5 (2000); (31) South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-40-10-190 (Law Co-op. 1998); 
(32) Texas, TEX. EDUC. CODE§§ 12.101-.118 (West 1999); (33) Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 53A-1a-501-514 (2000); (34) Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-212.5-.15 (Michie 
2000); (35) Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 118.40 (1999); (36) Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 
21-3-201-207 (Michie 2000). 
3. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-2801-2853.25 (1999). 
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dress these problems through the creation of charter schools. 
Charter schools are autonomous, or semi-autonomous, public 
schools that are created by a contract, or charter, between the 
school's organizers and a sponsor, usually the state's depart-
ment of education or a local school district. 5 The creators of 
charter schools are held accountable for achieving educational 
results. In return, the charter school receives waivers exempt-
ing it from many of the restrictions that apply to traditional 
public schools.6 
Many observers fear that charter schools will provide school 
officials the means to help white parents escape from racially 
desegregated public schools. 7 Several states have responded to 
this concern by adopting statutes that require charter schools 
to reflect the racial and ethnic composition of the surrounding 
school districts. 8 Statistical evidence does not support the con-
cern that charter schools will lead to white flight; few charter 
schools have a disproportionately high percentage of white stu-
dents.9 On the contrary, a high percentage of charter schools 
have a disproportionately high percentage of racial minori-
ties.10 In fact, rigid enforcement of charter school racial balanc-
ing provisions might prevent the development of charter 
schools that will benefit minority communities. 
States should rescind their charter school racial balancing 
provisions. The two primary policy rationales for adopting 
these provisions are that desegregated schools: (1) have a posi-
tive correlation to academic achievement; and (2) increase the 
likelihood of minority students to achieve long-term success in 
society. The research on mandatory desegregation policies does 
not support these two policy assertions. Furthermore, the ex-
periences of African-Americans in desegregated schools suggest 
that racial balancing provisions do not benefit minority com-
munities. 
Additionally, racial balancing provisions probably violate 
4. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2501-2585 (1999). 
5. NATHAN, supra note 1. 
6. ld. 
7. David J. Dent, Diversity Rules Threaten North Carolina Charter Schools that 
Aid Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1998, at B8. 
8. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text. 
9. RPP INT'L, A NATIONAL STUDY OF CHARTER SCHOOLS: SECOND-YEAR REPORT 
(1998). 
10. ld. 
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the Equal Protection Clause. All race-based governmental clas-
sifications must pass a two-prong test: (1) they must satisfy a 
compelling government interest; and (2) they must be narrowly 
tailored to that interest. 11 Charter school racial balancing pro-
visions fail both parts of this test. 
The first section of this paper provides an overview of the 
charter school movement, the second section explains the edu-
cational deficiencies of charter school racial balancing provi-
sions, and the third discusses why charter school racial balanc-
ing provisions probably violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT 
In 1983, the National Commission of Excellence warned in 
its influential report, A Nation at Risk, that the public schools 
were failing their mission to educate students by creating a 
"rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a 
Nation and a people."12 Charter schools are part of a wave of 
educational reforms designed to remedy the perceived inade-
quacy of the public schools. 13 Supporters believe that charter 
schools would encourage competition, provide new models of 
schooling, and create incentives to improve the public schools. 14 
The federal government has also provided statutory financial 
support to the charter school movement. 15 
Individual states determine the circumstances under which 
a charter school may be established. Despite this potential for 
variability, charter schools have several common characteris-
tics. First, states relieve charter schools of certain state laws 
and regulations in exchange for the charter school's commit-
11. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). 
12. DAVID P. GARDNER. ET AL., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM. AN OPEN LETTER TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. A REPORT TO Tim 
NATION AND THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 5 (1983). 
13. Jennifer T. Wall, The Establishment of Charter Schools: A Guide to Legalis-
sues for Legislatures, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 69 n.2 (1998). 
14. NATHAN, supra note 1. 
15. State educational agencies may use part of the money received under the 
Goals 2000: Educate America Act for the promotion of charter schools. 20 U.S.C.S. § 
5888 (Law. Co-op. 1999). Title I of the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 also 
seeks to encourage the development of charter schools through financial assistance, 
and evaluative studies. 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 8061-8067 (Law. Co-op. 1999). President Wil-
liam Clinton, in his State of the Union Address, called for the creation of 3,000 charter 
schools by the twenty-first century. President William Clinton, State of the Union Ad-
dress (Feb. 4, 1997). 
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ment, by means of a contract, to achieve specific outcomes.16 
Charter schools may not charge tuition, but utilize per pupil 
state aid dollars to fund their efforts. 17 Schools must outline 
their mission and curricular focus and undergo a review proc-
ess to qualify for charter school status. 18 Third, once those pro-
posing a school have adequately justified their educational plan 
to the sponsor, they must enter into a contract to deliver those 
services to the children who will elect to attend. 19 If the charter 
school fails to meet its goals, it must develop an educational 
plan in which it explains how it will accomplish the goals of the 
charter.20 If the charter school continues to fail, the sponsor 
21 
may revoke the charter. 
II. CHARTER SCHOOLS P.ND RACIAL BALANCING PROVISIONS 
Many observers fear that public officials will use charter 
schools to enable white parents and students to escape from 
desegregated public schools.22 This concern has a historical ba-
sis: after the Supreme Court had outlawed separate-but-equal 
education in Brown v. Board of Education,2 segregationists 
proposed school choice programs to circumvent school desegre-
gation efforts. 24 Nine states have responded to the concerns 
raised by charter school critics by enacting statutes, which en-
sure that the population of a charter school reflects the racial 
and ethnic composition of the school district as a whole. Cali-
fi . 2s Fl .d 26 w· . 27 d w . zs • h orma, on a, Isconsin, an yarning reqmre eac 
16. Julie F. Mead & Preston C. Green. Making Promises: Have Charter Schools 
Resurrected Educational Malpractice as a Cause of Action? Paper presented at the an-
nual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Montreal, April 22, 
1998 (1998) (paper on file with the author). 
17. ld. 
18. Id. 
19. ld. 
20. Id. 
21. ld. 
22. Dent, supra note 7. 
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
24. Stephen Eisdorfer, Colloquium, Racial Ceilings and School Choice: Public 
School Choice and Racial Integration, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 937 (1993). 
25. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(b)(5)(G) (West 2000) ("The governing board of the 
school district shall not deny a petition for the establishment of a charter school 
unless ... [t]he petition [fails to, inter alia] contain reasonably comprehensive descrip-
tions [of] ... [t]he means by which the school will achieve a racial and ethnic balance 
among its pupils that is reflective of the general population residing within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the school district to which the charter petition is submitted."). 
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charter school to adopt policies that will ensure such racial and 
ethnic balance. The statutes of Kansas,29 Minnesota,30 and 
North Carolina31 specifically require the charter school's racial 
and ethnic composition to reflect that of the surrounding school 
district. Nevada32 and South Carolina33 go further still by re-
quiring the racial and ethnic population of a charter school to 
differ by not more than ten percent from the racial composition 
of the surrounding school district. 
Statistical evidence does not support the concern that char-
ter schools will lead to white flight from traditional public 
schools. On the contrary, evidence suggests that minority 
communities are leaving traditional public schools to attend 
charter schools. A study of 16 charter school states, funded by 
the United States Department of Education, found that only 
26. FLA. STAT. § 228.056(9)(a)(8) (1999) ("The ... criteria for approval of the char-
ter shall be based on [inter alia] ... [t]he ways by which the school will achieve a ra-
ciaVethnic balance reflective of the community it serves or within the raciaVethnic 
range of other public schools in the same school district."). 
27. WIS. STAT. § 118.40(b)(9) (1999) ("The [charter school] petition shall in-
clude ... [t]he means by which the school will achieve a racial and ethnic balance 
among its pupils that is reflective of the school district population."). 
28. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-203(b)(vii) (Michie 2000) ("The board may grant a 
charter for the operation of a school ... if it determines the petition contains [inter 
alia] ... [t]he means by which the school will achieve a racial and ethnic balance 
among its pupils that is reflective of the general population residing within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the school district to which the charter petition is submitted."). 
29. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1906(d)(2) (1999) ("Pupils in attendance at the school 
must be reasonably reflective of the racial and socio-economic composition of the school 
district as a whole."). 
30. MINN. STAT. § 124D.10 Subdiv. 9(3) (1999) ("A charter school may limit ad-
mission to ... residents of a specific geographic area where the percentage of the popu-
lation of non-Caucasian people of that area is greater than the percentage of the non-
Caucasian population in the congressional district in which the geographic area is lo-
cated, and as long as the school reflects the racial and ethnic diversity of the specific 
area."). 
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29F(g)(5)(ii) (1999) ("Within one year after the 
charter school begins operation, the population of the school shall reasonably reflect 
the racial and ethnic composition of the general population residing within the local 
school administrative unit in which the school is located or the racial and ethnic com-
position of the special population that the school seeks to serve residing within the lo-
cal school administrative unit in which the school is located."). 
32. NEV. REV. STAT. § 386.580(1) (Michie 2000) ("[T]he charter school shall, if 
practicable, ensure that the racial composition of pupils enrolled in the charter school 
does not differ by more than 10 percent from the racial composition of pupils who at-
tend public schools in the zone in which the charter school is located."). 
33. S.C. CODE ANN§ 59-40-50(B)(6) (Law. Co-op 1998) ("[U]nder no circumstances 
may a charter school enrollment differ from the racial composition of the school district 
by more than ten percent."). 
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four percent of the charter schools in the sample were dispro-
portionately white: that is, served 20 percent more white stu-
dents than the districts in which they were located.34 However, 
the study also found that: (1) one out of three charter schools 
had a disproportionately high percentage of minority stu-
dents;35 and (2) approximately 40 percent of charter schools 
that enrolled predominantly African-American students were 
located in districts where the average white enrollment was 
36 
more than 50 percent. 
There are two possible reasons for this high percentage of 
predominantly minority charter schools. First, many charter 
schools are designed to address the needs of particular popula-
tions. 37 The Department of Education study found that the sec-
ond most cited reason for starting a charter school was to meet 
the needs of a particular population of children. 38 Charter 
schools also provide many minority parents, who feel disen-
franchised in traditional public schools, the opportunity to be-
come more involved with the design of their children's educa-
tional program.39 Moreover, charter school statutes create 
incentives to design educational programming that will benefit 
minority students. For example, the statutes of several states 
encourage proposals to focus on the needs of "at risk" students. 
Colorado,40 Illinois,41 New York, 42 and North Carolina43 give 
34. RPP INT'L, supra note 9, at 56. 
35. Id. at 72. 
36. I d. at 64. 
37. I d. at 62. 
38. ld. 
39. Robin D. Barnes, Group Conflict and the Constitution: Race, Sexuality, and 
Religion: Black America and School Choice: Charting a New Course, 106 YALE L.J. 
2375 (1997). 
40. COLO. REV. STAT § 22-30.5-109(3) (1999) ("It is the intent of the general as-
sembly that priority of consideration be given to charter school applications designed to 
increase the educational opportunities of at-risk pupils."). 
41. ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/27A-8(3)(West 2000) ("In evaluating any charter school 
proposal submitted to it, the local school board shall give preference to proposals 
that ... are designed to enroll and serve a substantial proportion of at-risk children."). 
42. N.Y. C.L.S EDUC. § 2852(2)(c) (McKinney 2000) ("In reviewing applications, 
the charter entity is encouraged to give preference to applications that demonstrate the 
capability to provide comprehensive learning experiences to students identified by the 
applicants as at risk of academic failure."). 
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29C(b)(iiil (1999) ("In reviewing applications for 
the establishment of charter schools within a local school administrative unit, the char-
tering entity is encouraged to give preference to applications that demonstrate the ca-
pability to provide comprehensive learning experiences to students identified by the 
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preference to charter school proposals that serve at-risk chil-
dren, while Oregon 44 provides grants and loans to charter 
schools that meet this need. 
Second, many charter schools that are attractive to minori-
ties have experienced a difficult time convincing white parents 
to enroll their children. There are several explanations for this 
inability to recruit whites. Some white parents may not be edu-
cationally interested in charter schools that have educational 
themes that are attractive to minority students.45 Additionally, 
some white parents may fear the neighborhoods in which some 
minority-theme charter schools are located.46 The Healthy 
Start Academy, a charter school located in Durham, North 
Carolina is a case in point. Located in a black neighborhood, 
the charter school was able to attract only two white students, 
even after engaging in an intense recruitment process. 47 
The enforcement of charter school racial balancing provi-
sions might prevent the development of charter schools that 
address the educational concerns of minority communities. The 
experience of North Carolina's charter schools supports this as-
sertion. In 1998, 22 of the North Carolina's 60 charter schools 
were not in compliance with the state's racial balancing provi-
sion;48 all but one of these 22 schools were predominantly 
black.49 The teachers' union and several state legislators called 
for the schools to comply with the state's racial balancing pro-
vision within a year or be closed. 50 The Healthy Start Academy 
filed suit in trial court to challenge the constitutionality of the 
statute's racial balancing provision.51 A legal challenge was 
applicants as at risk of academic failure."). 
44. OR. REV. STAT. § 338.152(2) (1999) ("Pursuant to rules adopted by the State 
Board of Education, the Department of Education shall award grants and loans on the 
basis of need. Priority for awarding grants and loans shall be to those public charter 
schools serving at-risk youth."). 
45. For example, Harvest Preparatory School, a Minneapolis charter school, com-
bines an Afrocentric curriculum with an emphasis on basic skills. John Ramsay, A Di-
rect Challenge; An Irresistible Question Presented Itself as an Educator Studied an Ur-
ban School's Highly Touted, But Controversial, Reading Program: Would It Work for 
His Preschooler?, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Jul. 9, 1998. 
46. Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE 
258 (1997) (discussing white fear of black neighborhoods). 
47. Dent, supra note 7. 
48. !d. 
49. !d. 
50. !d. 
51. Christopher Kirkpatrick, Lawsuit Tests Charter School Race Clause: Healthy 
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avoided after the chairman of the state board of education 
promised not to take action against schools that are not in 
compliance with the state's racial balancing provision. 52 
States should rescind their racial balancing provisions so as 
not to prevent the development of charter schools that address 
minority concerns. The two primary policy rationales for adopt-
ing these provisions build upon the arguments used for adopt-
ing mandatory desegregation policies such as busing. The first 
claim is that desegregated schools have a positive correlation to 
academic achievement. For example, more than 40 years ago, 
less than 50 percent of young black adults had obtained high 
school diplomas or passed the General Educational Develop-
ment (GED) Test; by 1993, this figure had increased to 83 per-
cent, close to white completion rate. 53 
The second claim is that desegregated schools increase the 
likelihood of minority students to achieve long-term success in 
society. Predominantly minority schools tend to have high rates 
of poverty. 54 High poverty schools generally have low test 
scores, high dropout rates, and a low percentage of students 
who will eventually attend college. 55 According to a field of edu-
cational research known as "perpetuation theory," minorities 
who attend poor, segregated schools may become isolated from 
mainstream society, thus losing out on opportunity to enter 
into the middle class.56 School desegregation helps minority 
students break out of this cycle of isolation. 57 In support of this 
thesis, proponents of perpetuation theory cite studies showing 
that students attending desegregated schools are more likely to 
Start Academy, N.C. Conservative Group Join Forces, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), 
Aug. 15, 1998, at A6. 
52. The chairman stated that no action would be taken against any charter school 
that would attempt to be diverse. Christopher Kirkpatrick, Charter School Bill Still 
Stalled on Racial Issues: Lawmakers Shelve Diversity Clause until Next Session, 
HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Oct. 5, 1998, at Bl. However, states should not follow 
the route suggested by the chairman by amending charter school statutes to require 
charter schools to attempt to be racially and ethnically diverse. Schools with educa-
tional themes that target special populations would still have a difficult time attracting 
students who are members of that group. 
53. GARY 0RFIELD ET. AL. DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL 
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 85 (1996). 
54. ld. at 53. 
55. Id. 
56. ld. at 106. 
57. Id. 
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succeed in college and have higher occupational aspirations.58 
The research on mandatory desegregation policies does not 
support these two policy assertions. David Armor has con-
ducted a comprehensive examination of mandatory desegrega-
tion policies. Although there may be a correlation between 
mandatory desegregation policies and African-American 
achievement, Armor has found that "the relationship is gener-
ally weak and inconsistent compared to the effect of educa-
tional and economic factors."59 In fact, the improved socioeco-
nomic state of the African-American family and federal 
compensatory programs such as Chapter 1 were significantly 
more important contributors than school desegregation.60 Ar-
mor does find that "the research on long-term outcomes offers 
61 the strongest argument for desegregated schools"; however, 
he concludes that the studies in this area are inconsistent and 
the positive results may be confined to voluntary desegregation 
62 plans. 
Furthermore, Armor has found that mandatory school de-
segregation policies may actually lower black self-esteem.63 One 
explanation for this finding is the discrimination that many Af-
rican-Americans have experienced in desegregated schools.64 A 
disproportionately high percentage of African-American stu-
dents attending desegregated public schools are placed in low 
educational tracks.65 African-Americans students are also more 
likely to be expelled or suspended from desegregated schools 
than white students are. 66 Moreover, many African-American 
parents believe that they have been unable to advocate for 
their children's interests in desegregated schools because white 
parents and school officials have prevented them from partici-
pating in the schools' decision making process. 67 
Predominantly minority charter schools may be more suc-
cessful than desegregated schools in meeting the psychological 
58. !d. 
59. DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 98 
(1995). 
60. !d. 
61. !d. at 113. 
62. !d. 
63. !d. at 101. 
64. !d. 
65. Barnes, supra note 39. 
66. !d. 
67. !d. 
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and academic needs of their students. These schools may 
strengthen the commitment of minority parents by providing 
them with the orportunity to participate in their development 
and governance. Charter schools' freedom from state regula-
tions may enable minority parents to develop programs that 
address the emotional needs of their children.69 These schools 
must also succeed academically, or run the risk of losing the 
charters. 70 Moreover, rescinding racial balancing provisions 
would be consistent with the shift of African-American atti-
tudes toward mandatory desegregation policies. African-
Americans have historically supported desegregation policies. 71 
During the 1990s, however, African-Americans have become 
more supportive of all-minority neighborhood schools due to 
their frustration with persistent gaps in academic achievement 
between blacks and whites and the inconvenience of mandatory 
desegregation policies.72 They have also begun to reject the no-
tion that all-black schools are academicall:1 inferior and reduce 
the motivation of black students to learn. 7 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CHARTER SCHOOL RACIAL BALANCING 
PROVISIONS 
The previous section noted that charter school racial bal-
ancing provisions might have the unexpected result of prevent-
ing the creation of charter schools that help minority communi-
ties. Charter school racial balancing provisions may also be 
vulnerable to Equal Protection Clause challenges. The Equal 
Protection Clause protects against, among other things, racial 
classifications by the government. 74 Because racial balancing 
provisions employ racial classifications, they should be subject 
to strict scrutiny. The purpose of strict scrutiny is "to 'smoke 
out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative 
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a 
68. Id. 
69. ld. 
70. ld. 
71. Id. 
72. Megan Twohey, Desegregation Is Dead, 31 NAT'LJ., Sep. 18, 1999, at 2614. 
73. ld. 
74. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV,§ 1. 
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highly suspect tool."75 To pass strict scrutiny, all race-based 
governmental classifications must satisfy a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and be narrowly tliilored to that interest.76 
The South Carolina judiciary is presently grappling with 
the constitutionality of its racial balancing provision. In Beau-
fort County Board of Education v. Lighthouse Charter School 
Committee, the Beaufort (South Carolina) Board of Education 
denied the application for the Lighthouse Charter School, in 
part, because the school had failed to explain how it would 
comply with the state's requirement that the charter school's 
population be within 10 percent of the surrounding school dis-
trict.77 The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the denial 
of the charter school's application on this ground,78 but re-
manded the case to trial court to determine whether the state's 
racial balancing provision violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. 79 
This section examines whether charter school racial balanc-
ing provisions would survive Equal Protection Clause chal-
lenges. The first subsection examines whether charter school 
racial balancing provisions would satisfy compelling govern-
mental interests identified by the Supreme Court. The second 
subsection analyzes whether such provisions would satisfy 
other compelling interests recognized by legal commentators 
and lower federal courts. The third subsection looks at whether 
racial balancing provisions would be narrowly tailored. 
A Do Racial Balancing Provisions Satisfy Compelling 
Governmental Interests Identified by the Supreme Court? 
The Supreme Court has recognized two compelling interests 
under strict scrutiny analysis: (1) to eliminate the present ef-
fects of past discrimination,80 and (2) to achieve a diverse stu-
dent body in the context of university admissions decisions. 81 
75. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989). 
76. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235. 
77. 516 S.E.2d 655 (S.C. 1999). 
78. !d. at 659. 
79. Id. at 661. 
80. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion); 
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,491-92 (1989); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 
237. 
81. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (opinion of Pow-
ell, J.). 
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Courts would probably rule that racial balancing provisions fail 
to satisfy the compelling interest of eliminating the present ef-
fects of past discrimination. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 
the Supreme Court invalidated Richmond, Virginia's set-aside 
program which required prime contractors to award 30% of the 
dollar amount of each contract to one or more minority busi-
ness enterprises (MBE's). Minority groups consisted of "Blacks2 Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts."8 
The Court rejected the claim that the set-aside program was 
designed to eliminate the present effects of past discrimination 
because: 
There is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against 
Spanishspeaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons 
in any aspect of the Richmond construction industry .... It 
may well be that Richmond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo 
citizen. The random inclusion of racial groups that, as a prac-
tical matter, may never have suffered from discrimination in 
the construction industry in Richmond suggests that perhaps 
the city's purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimina-
tion.83 
Similarly, courts would rule that racial balancing provi-
sions are not designed to eliminate the present effects of past 
discrimination. They not only apply to charter schools located 
in school districts that have discriminated against minority 
groups; but they also apply to charter schools located in school 
districts that have not committed such discrimination. 
Racial balancing provisions also fail to satisfy the compel-
ling interest of obtaining a diverse student body. In Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court held 
that universities may use race as one of several factors in mak-
ing their admissions decisions. 84 However, the Bakke Court for-
82. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 4 78. 
83. !d. at 506 (emphasis by the Court). 
84. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (opinion of Powell, J.). The constitutionality of Bakke 
is presently being debated in the courts. In Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 
1996), the Fifth Circuit held that a university's use of race to achieve a diverse student 
body is unconstitutional because such considerations stigmatized minority applicants, 
and contradicted the Equal Protection Clause's primary goal of eliminating all consid-
erations of race. Other circuit courts, however, have to follow the First Circuit's lead. 
For example, in Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1999), a case dealing with 
the constitutionality of examination school's admissions policies, the First Circuit re-
fused to declare Bakke unconstitutional in the absence of a clear signal from the Su-
preme Court. !d. at 796. Following the analysis of the First Circuit, this article as-
sumes that Bakke is still good law. 
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bade universities from using race and ethnicity as the sole fac-
tors for obtaining a diverse student body because: "[t]he diver-
sity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far 
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which ra-
cial or ethnic origin is but a single though important ele-
ment."85 The Court also prohibited universities from taking 
steps to obtain a specific racial balance in their student compo-
sition: 
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body 
some specified percentage of a particular group merely be-
cause of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose 
must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid. 
Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than 
race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This 
the Constitution forbids. 86 
In Wessmann u. Gittens, the First Circuit applied the logic 
of Bakke to pre-collegiate setting. In Wessmann, the First Cir-
cuit invalidated the Boston School Committee's admissions pol-
icy for its three examination schools. To be eligible for admis-
sion, an applicant had to be in the top 50 percent of the school's 
overall applicant pool.87 Half of the available seats for an ex-
amination school's entering class were allocated according to 
test scores and grade point averages.88 The second half were 
chosen according to the proportional representation of five dif-
ferent racial and ethnic groups - white, black, Latino, Asian, 
and Native American - from the remaining pool of qualified 
1. t 89 app 1can s. 
Because the admissions policy focused only on racial and 
ethnic diversity, 90 the First Circuit held that the proportional 
representation scheme failed to satisfy the compelling interest 
test. 91 Instead of achieving diversity, the court concluded that 
the School Committee's admissions plan was designed to 
achieve racial balancing, which is almost always constitution-
ally forbidden. 92 To justify the use of racial balancing, the court 
85. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
86. !d. at 307 (citations omitted). 
87. Wessman, 160 F.3d at 790. 
88. Id. 
89. ld. 
90. !d. at 798. 
91. ld. 
92. ld. at 799. 
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found that "a particularly strong showing of necessity would be 
required."93 The School Committee failed to meet this burden. 
The court rejected the claim that racial balancing protected Af-
rican-American and Hispanic students from the harmful effects 
of racial isolation because the racial isolation argument as-
sumed that students could not function unless they were sur-
rounded by a sufficient number of persons of like race or eth-
nicity.94 Additionally, the court held that the that School 
Committee had failed to demonstrate why the proportional 
representation scheme promoted was better than constitution-
ally permissible alternatives to achieve diversity in promoting 
the vigorous exchange of ideas or improving the students' ca-
pacity and willingness to learn.95 
Applying Bakke and Wessmann, courts would hold that 
charter school racial balancing provisions fail to satisfy the 
compelling interest of achieving a diverse student body. They 
would rule that charter school racial provisions are unconstitu-
tional because race and ethnicity are the only criteria used to 
determine diversity. Also, as Wessmann demonstrates, courts 
would be highly skeptical of any rationale advanced for adopt-
ing a racial balancing provision to obtain a diverse student 
body. 
B. May Charter School Racial Balancing Provisions Be Used 
to Prevent Other Possible Compelling Governmental Interests? 
96 97 Legal commentators and courts have asserted that other 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 799-800. 
96. Jason Walbourn, Comment, Strict in Theory, but Not Fatal in Fact: Hunter u. 
Regents of the University of California and the Case for Educational Research as a New 
Compelling State Interest, 83 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1998) (arguing that educational re-
search can be a compelling governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause); 
Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions Programs in Public Elemen-
tary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARV. L. REV. 940 (1999) (arguing that other compel-
ling interests under the Equal Protection Clause could include providing a quality edu-
cation, and providing equal educational opportunity). 
97. Eisenberg v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449 (D.Md. 1998) 
(finding that prevention of possible segregative effects of voluntary enrollment policy 
constituted compelling governmental interest under Equal Protection Clause); Hunter 
v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that educational 
research can be a compelling governmental interest under the Equal Protection 
Clause); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d. Cir. 
1979) (finding that eliminating de facto segregation can serve a compelling governmen-
tal interest). 
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compelling governmental interests exist besides eliminating 
the present effects of past discrimination and achieving a di-
verse student body. For instance, in Parent Association of An-
drew Jackson High School v. Ambach, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that reducing de facto 
segregation serves a compelling government interest. This case 
involved a desegregation plan focused primarily on the Andrew 
Jackson High School in Queens, New York. Queens had experi-
enced a large influx of minority residents after World War II 
and a corresponding departure ofwhite families to the adjacent 
suburbs. 98 Consequently, Andrew Jackson High School became 
a virtually all-minority school.99 The school board adopted a 
"Controlled Rate of Change Plan," which permitted black and 
Hispanic students to transfer to schools in which white stu-
dents exceeded 50 percent of the student population. 100 White 
students could transfer to schools where the white student 
population was lower than 50 percent. 101 The plan limited the 
number of students allowed to transfer in any given year to 
those who would not decrease the receiVmg schools' 
white/minority balance by four percent or more. 102 
Minority students who were not permitted to transfer to de-
sired schools challenged the constitutionality of the choice pro-
gram.103 The Second Circuit held that it lacked the authority to 
compel the school board to achieve a racial balance in the high 
school because the seRregation had not been caused by inten-
tional discrimination. 04 Applying strict scrutiny analysis, the 
court did find that the school board had a compellinR interest 
in ensuring that schools were relatively integrated. 05 To en-
sure such integration, the school board could take steps to 
avoid white flight. Although the purpose of the plan was consti-
tutional, the Second Circuit remanded the case to work out 
'fi d t '1 106 spec1 1c e a1 s. 
The Supreme Court has also implied that school districts 
98. Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson, 598 U.S. at 710. 
99. !d. 
100. !d. at 711. 
101. !d. 
102. !d. at 711-12. 
103. Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson, 738 F.2d 574, 577 (2d. Cir. 1984). 
104. Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson, 598 U.S. at 715. 
105. !d. at 720. 
106. !d. at 721. 
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may use racial balancing provisions to eliminate de facto segre-
gation. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 
the first decision to approve mandatory busing to eliminate of-
ficial discrimination, the Court observed: 
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power 
to formulate and implement educational policy and might 
well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students 
to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a pre-
scribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the propor-
tion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational 
policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school au-
thorities; absent a finding of a constitutional violation, how-
ever, that would not be within the authority of a federal 
court.
107 
Although Swann involved official discrimination, this 
statement suggests that the Supreme Court would permit race-
based assignments to remedy de facto segregation. 108 North 
Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, a companion case 
decided at the same time as Swann, supports this assertion. In 
North Carolina State Board of Education, the Court invali-
dated a state statute forbidding student assignments for the 
purpose of achieving a specific racial balance. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court explained that Swann held "as a matter 
of educational policy school authorities may well conclude that 
some kind of racial balance is desirable quite apart from any 
constitutional requirements."109 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 provides further 
support for the belief that the Supreme Court would uphold the 
constitutionality of racial balancing plans designed to eliminate 
de facto segregation. In Washington, the Court analyzed the 
constitutionality of a Washington statute that prohibited local 
school districts from using mandatory busing to upset 
neighborhood school enrollment patterns. The Court ruled that 
the statute was unconstitutional because it removed authority 
to eliminate de facto segregation in a manner that burdened 
minority interests. 110 If a state could not prohibit a district from 
using race-based assignments to eliminate de facto segregation 
107. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ .• 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). 
108. William E. Thro, The Constitutionality Of Eliminating De Facto Segregation 
In The Public Schools, 120 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 895, 901 (1997). 
109. North Carolina Bd. ofEduc. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971). 
110. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474-75 (1982). 
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without violating the Equal Protection Clause, then it follows 
that local school districts have the right to engap-e in race-
based assignments to remedy de facto segregation. 11 
Despite the implicit endorsement of the Swann, North 
Carolina State Board of Education, and Washington cases, 
courts would probably find that eliminating the effects of de 
facto segregation does not satisfy a compelling governmental 
interest. Proponents have advanced several reasons for approv-
ing plans that eliminate the effects of de facto segregation, in-
cluding providing minority students with equal educational op-
portunit~ and preparing students for a culturally pluralistic 
society. 1 2 Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has been 
especially critical of the argument that integration is necessary 
to provide minority students with equal educational opportu-
nity. As he asserted in his concurrence in Missouri v. Jenkins: 
"[T]here is no reason to think black students cannot learn as 
well when surrounded by members of their own race as when 
they are in an integrated environment ... black schools can 
function as the center and symbol of black communities, and 
provide examples of independent black leadership, success, and 
achievement."113 Also, courts would find that using racial bal-
ancing provisions to achieve cultural diversity would not sat-
isfy a compelling governmental interest. In Bakke, the Su-
preme Court stated that race could be one of several criteria 
used to achieve diversity. 114 Therefore, racial balancing provi-
sions would be unconstitutional because they fail to take fac-
tors other than race into consideration to achieve cultural plu-
ralism. 
School districts could also argue that predominantly one-
race charter schools raise an inference of discrimination on the 
part of charter school sponsors, and that the state has a com-
pelling interest to prevent sponsors from using charter schools 
to facilitate racial segregation. 115 Courts would probably refuse 
to infer discrimination on the part of charter school sponsors 
merely because several charter schools have a disproportion-
111. Thro, supra note 108, at 901. 
112. ORFIELD ET. AL., supra note 53. 
113. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 95 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
114. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
115. See Eisenberg, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 453 (finding that prevention of possible seg-
regative effects of voluntary enrollment policy constituted compelling governmental 
interest under Equal Protection Clause). 
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ately high percentage of members from one racial group. In 
City of Richmond, the Supreme Court refused to infer that low 
participation of minority business enterprises in local contract-
ing agencies was caused by the agencies' discriminatory ac-
tions. 
There are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority 
participation [in construction], including . . . both black and 
white career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be dis-
proportionately attracted to industries other than construc-
tion .... The mere fact that black membership in these trade 
organizations is low, standinfl alone, cannot establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination." 6 
Future court decisions may reason that the existence of dis-
proportionately one-race charter schools may be caused by fac-
tors other than racially exclusionary practices on the part of 
charter school sponsors. Many charter schools have educational 
themes that are particular to one racial group. For example, 
the underlying premise of one of the schools participating in 
the U.S. Department of Education study on charter schools is 
"the belief that building a strong Afrocentric identity will give 
the youth the power and strength to succeed in life."117 Al-
though these schools are open to all students, their educational 
mission may attract a disproportionate number of minority 
students. 118 
C. Are Charter School Racial Balancing Provisions Narrowly 
Tailored? 
Even if charter school racial balancing provisions served a 
compelling governmental interest, they must also be narrowly 
tailored to satisfy that interest. In United States u. Paradise, 
the Supreme Court identified several factors for determining 
whether governmental racial classifications were narrowly tai-
lored: (1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral remedies; (2) 
the flexibility of the relief; (3) the duration of the relief; (4) the 
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant population; 
and (5) the impact of the policy on third parties. m 
Courts would probably find that charter school racial bal-
116. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 503. 
117. RPP INT'L, supra note 9, at 67. 
118. Id. 
119. U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987). 
65] RACIAL BALANCING IN CHARTER SCHOOLS 83 
ancing provisions are not narrowly tailored. First, courts might 
conclude that states have failed to establish that less drastic 
policies such as voluntary recruitment, or lottery, may be just 
as effective for attaining the goals of eliminating the present 
effects of past discrimination, or achieving a diverse student 
body. 120 Second, courts would find fault with the duration of 
these provisions. The Supreme Court has ruled that racial clas-
sifications cannot continue in perpetuity, but must have a logi-
cal "stopping point."121 Charter school racial balancing provi-
sions have no such stopping point: each charter school must 
continually ensure that its student population reflects that of 
the school district as a whole. 
Third, courts would probably find fault with the relation-
ship between the numerical goal and the relevant population. 
Charter school racial balancing provisions seek to achieve com-
pelling governmental interests by requiring the racial and eth-
nic composition of charter schools to reflect that of the sur-
rounding school districts. Courts have expressed doubt that 
racial balancing provisions are necessary to achieve compelling 
governmental interests. For example, in Tuttle u. Arlington 
County School Board, the Fourth Circuit invalidated an alter-
native school's weighted admission policy, which was designed 
to achieve a racial and ethnic population similar to that of the 
school district as a whole. The court found that policy's goals of 
providing students with the educational benefits of diversity 
and helping the school board better meet the needs of a diverse 
group of students did not require racial balancing. 122 
Finally, courts would conclude that charter school racial 
balancing provisions are not sufficiently particularized to cure 
harms committed against a class of actual victims. For in-
stance, in Wessmann, the First Circuit found that the Boston 
School Committee's proportional representation scheme was 
not narrowly tailored to remedy the present effects of past dis-
crimination. Specifically, the court found that the policy was 
not focused on the African-American and Hispanic public 
school students who were the victims of racial discrimination. 
Many of the African-American and Hispanic students benefit-
120. See e.g., Equal Open Enrollment Ass'n v. Board of Education of the Akron 
Cty. Sch. Dist., 937 F. Supp. 700, 708 (N.D.Ohio 1996); Tuttle v. Arlington Cty. Sch. 
Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 706 nll (4th Cir. 1999). 
121. City o{Richmond, 488 U.S. at 498; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275. 
122. Tuttle, 195 F.3d. at 707. 
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ing from the policy attended private and parochial schools. 123 
Similarly, courts would find that charter school racial balanc-
ing provisions fail the narrow tailoring requirement because 
they apply to charter schools in school districts that are not 
suffering from the effects of past discrimination. Courts might 
also support this conclusion by noting that states have adopted 
more particularized approaches that do apply to charter schools 
located in school districts that are still experiencing the ves-
tiges of school segregation policies, such as requirin,p charter 
schools to comply with school desegregation decrees. 12 
IV. CONCLUSION 
States should rescind their charter school racial balancing 
provisions. While one can argue that such provisions protect 
against the development of high-poverty, predominantly minor-
ity schools, and enable students to learn in a racially and cul-
turally diverse student body, the experiences of African-
Americans in desegregated schools indicate that enforcement of 
racial balancing provisions may not benefit minority communi-
ties. Also, racial balancing provisions should be rescinded be-
cause they violate the Equal Protection Clause. All race-based 
governmental classifications must satisfy a compelling gov-
ernment interest and be narrowly tailored to that interest. As 
has been shown above, charter school racial balancing provi-
sions likely fail both parts of this test. 
123. Wessmann, 190 F.3d at 808. 
124. These states are as follows: (1) Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-184(D) (2000) ; 
(2) Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(3) (1999); (3) Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit.14, § 506(5) (1999); (4) Illinois, 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27A-4(a) (West 2000); (5) 
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. § 17:3991(C)(3) (2000); (6) Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
386.550(4) (Michie 2000); (7) North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT § 115C-238.29F(g)(5)(ii) 
(1999); (8) Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN§ 3314.06 (Anderson 2000); (9) Oklahoma, OKLA. 
STAT. § 3-140(8) (1999); (10) Pennsylvania, 24 PA. STAT. § 17-1730-A (2000); (11) Vir-
ginia, VA. CODE ANN.§ 22.1-212.6 (A) (Michie 2000). 
